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I. INTRODUCTION
"In the beginning, God Created the Heavens and the Earth."I Soon
thereafter, attorneys created the oil and gas lease form. Over the last century,
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these resources in the United States. Although the widespread use of lease
forms has not changed much, the oil and gas industry has experienced a number
of changes during that time period. There have been volumes written on the
subject, and this article will not attempt to cover everything, focusing instead on
recent West Virginia case law in the context of prior law in West Virginia and
other jurisdictions.
During the last ten years, several courts of other jurisdictions have taken
renewed, in-depth looks into the covenants implied in oil and gas leases. While
several of these implied covenants seem to be getting more attention in the court
system, the most significant is the implied covenant to market. This article will
give particular attention to the issue of the implied covenant to market and the
deductions of post-production costs from royalty payments. This article will
provide practitioners with an informative look into where West Virginia oil and
gas law stands in the wake of one of the most significant decisions in recent
years.
In 2001, the West Virginia high court issued its opinion in Wellman v.
Energy Resources, Inc.2 In Wellman, the court broke away from the traditional
view on post-production costs and held that when a proceeds lease is silent on
the issue of costs, the lessee has an implied covenant to market the gas pro-
duced. Included in this duty is the responsibility to incur all costs associated
with exploring, producing, marketing, and transporting the gas to market. The
court also left the door to the courtroom cracked, with an open invitation to liti-
gate other issues concerning post-production costs, royalty provisions, and oil
and gas lease construction.
Part II of this article will discuss some of the distinctions between pro-
duction costs and post-production costs. Part III will provide a general discus-
sion of the oil and gas lease. Included in this section will be brief discussion on
the most common types of royalty provisions, the "market value" and "pro-
ceeds" clauses. Additionally, this section will briefly address the "at the well"
language in the royalty clause as well as the differences between express and
implied covenants. Part IV will discuss the traditional view on royalty clauses
and deductions of costs. The traditional view holds that once the gas is brought
to the surface "at the well," the lessee's duties to explore and produce have been
fulfilled. Once the gas reaches the surface, the lessee and lessor share propor-
tionately in the post-production costs. West Virginia followed this rule prior to,
Wellman, despite the court's traditional bias favoring the lessor.
Part V will discuss the more recent breaks from the traditional view on
the deduction of costs from royalty payments. Colorado, Kansas, and Oklahoma
have all broken away from the traditional position on post-production costs.
These jurisdictions hold that where the lease is silent on the allocation of post-
production costs, the lessee alone bears the post-production costs. Part VI will
discuss the West Virginia jurisprudence on the subject, including the more re-
2 557 S.E.2d 254 (W.Va. 2001).
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cent departure. Part VII will break down the holding in Wellman and discuss
the implications the Wellman decision will have on oil and gas producers and
royalty owners in West Virginia. Finally, part VIII will be a brief conclusion. If
West Virginia courts are going to apply this line of reasoning to the interpreta-
tion of oil and gas leases, oil and gas producers need to explicitly spell out the
allocation of all costs in the lease.
Before discussing how the typical oil and gas lease form apportions
post-production costs (costs subsequent to production), it is necessary to have a
basic understanding of what costs are typically categorized as production costs
and what are categorized as post-production costs.
II. POST-PRODUCTION COSTS
The starting point of discussion must be the differences between costs
associated with production and actual post-production costs (costs incurred sub-
sequent to production). As developed in Part III, the main reason for entering
into an oil and gas lease is to produce the subsurface minerals to the mutual
benefit and profit of the lessor and the lessee. Although the owner of a mineral
estate can explore for oil and gas, very few have the technology or the capital
necessary to develop these minerals. 3 Even if the owner was capable of conduct-
ing exploration and development, very few would be willing to take the risk
associated with such operations.4 It is for these reasons that the owner of a min-
eral estate will enter into an oil and gas lease with a production company.
Historically, the majority of the costs incurred are associated with pro-
duction. The only way the lessor can earn royalty payments is if the minerals
are actually produced and sold. Typical of the costs associated with production
are the costs necessary to bring the minerals to the surface. The cost of produc-
tion is borne completely by the lessee.
[P]roduction costs are the expenses incurred in exploring for
mineral substances and in bringing them to the surface. Absent
an express term to the contrary in the lease, these costs are not
chargeable to the non-operating royalty interest [lessor]. Costs
incurred after production of the gas or minerals are normally
proportionately borne by both the operator [lessee] and the roy-
alty interest owner [lessor]. 5
GARY B. CONINE, The Future Course of Oil And Gas Jurisprudence: Speculation, Prudent
Operation, And The Economics Of OilAnd Gas Law, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 670, 674 (1994).
4 See id.
5 Parker v. TXO Prod. Corp., 716 S.W.2d 1986 (Tex. App. 1986). See generally PATRICK H.
MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS ON OIL AND GAS LAW § 645.2 (1998).
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This is consistent with the lessee (typically) retaining a seven-eighths
(7/8) interest on all oil or gas produced. Included in the category of production
costs are: exploration; geological surveys; drilling; development; building test
wells; testing, completing, or re-working existing wells. A good way to general-
ize production costs is to think of all costs incurred in discovering, drilling, ex-
ploring, and developing the minerals to the point of bringing them to the sur-
face.
Under the traditional view, once the gas is extracted from the wellhead
and brought to the surface, the post-production costs are borne proportionately
by the lessor and lessee. Some examples of post-production costs include: gath-
ering, transportation, processing, and marketing, reasonably incurred by the
lessee. Gathering "refers to the process of collecting gas at the point of produc-
tion (the wellhead) and moving it to a collection point for further movement
through a pipeline's principal transmission system."6 Transportation "involves
the movement of gas through a pipeline's principal transmission system, ... and
is sometimes used to include exchange, backhauling, and displacement." 7
However, "the lessor is entitled to a royalty free and clear of costs at the well-
head; if the product cannot be disposed of at the wellhead to a purchaser, then
the lessor must normally share in the expenses of transporting the product to
market."
8
"Processing means any process designed to remove elements or com-
pounds (hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon) from gas, including absorption,
adsorption, or refrigeration. Field processes which normally take place on or
near the lease, such as natural pressure reduction, mechanical separation, heat-
ing, cooling, dehydration, and compression are not considered processing."
9
Dehydration involves the "removal of water" from oil or gas produced in
wells. to Compression typically involves installing a facility that raises "the pres-
sure of the gas... for transmission through pipe lines while the gas is cooled,
scrubbed, and dehydrated."' 1
6 N. Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 929 F.2d 1261, 1265 (8th Cir.
1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 856 (1991) (citing WILLIAMS & MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS
TERMS, 406-07 (8th ed. 1987)).
7 Id. See 85 F.E.R.C. at 61, 768 for a discussion of the series of FERC opinions used to gen-
erate the general test used to differentiate between gathering and transportation (the Primary Func-
tion Test).
8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 1157 (citing Molter v. Lewis, 134
P.2d 404 (Kan. 1943)). See also MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 5, at §§ 645-645.3.
9 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 8, at 850. See also 30 C.F.R. § 206.101, and 30 C.F.R. §
206.151 (1991).
10 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 8, at 269.
11 Id. at 195.
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III. THE OIL AND GAS LEASE
A. General Purpose of the Oil and Gas Lease
The oil and gas lease governs the relationship between the landowners
(lessors) and production companies (lessees). 12 It is the oil and gas lease that
describes the manner in which exploration, development, and production are to
be conducted. According to Professor Donley, "the primary object of both les-
sor and lessee is to discover, produce and market subsurface minerals to their
mutual profit."'13 Moreover, in his treatise, Professor Eugene Kuntz stated:
(t]he real consideration and inducement which moves the par-
ties to enter into such a transaction is the expectation of the dis-
covery and production of oil or gas or a related mineral, with
the resulting benefit to the lessor in the form of royalties and
with a resulting benefit to the lessee in the form of profits from
sale of the products of the wells which the lessee might drill.
1 4
Historically, production companies have acquired oil and gas leases
from landowners who usually do not have the benefit of legal representation. In
1896, the West Virginia Supreme Court observed that companies engaged in the
exploration and production of oil and gas would send out legions of agents
armed with pre-printed lease forms to solicit leases from people who have no
legal representation and who have little working knowledge of the day-to-day
operations of oil and gas companies. 15 Although the oil and gas industry has
gone through a number of changes, the widespread use of lease forms has not
changed.
The most important clause in the oil and gas lease is the royalty clause.
It is the royalty clause that establishes the basis for calculating the lessors' roy-
alty payments when the gas is sold. However, the standard royalty clause often
fails to address issues pertaining to post-production costs because historically,
the major percentage of costs were related to exploration, drilling, and getting
12 For a more in depth discussion of oil and gas leases, see ROBERT TUCKER DONLEY, THE
LAW OF COAL, OIL, AND GAS IN WEST VIRGINIA AND VIRGINIA (1951); EUGENE KUNTz, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (1989); David A. Pierce, Incorporating A Century of Oil
and Gas Jurisprudence into the "Modern" Oil and Gas Lease, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 786, 787
(1994).
13 ROBERT TUCKER DONLEY, THE LAW OF COAL, OIL, AND GAS IN WEST VIRGINIA AND
VIRGINIA (1951). Professor Donley's treatise on the law of oil and gas is regarded as one of the
most comprehensive and thorough examinations of the law of oil and gas in West Virginia and is
cited by a number of treatise, law review articles, and judicial opinions.
14 EUGENEKuNTz, A TREATISEONTHELAWOFOILANDGAS, § 38.1(a) (1989).
15 See Bettman v. Harness, 26 S.E. 271, 276 (1896).
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the gas to the surface. 16 It has been observed by a few commentators that the
royalty clause is the most ambiguous clause in a lease17 and therefore the most
litigated. 18 Often times, the language of the royalty clause makes it difficult to
determine how the royalty is to be calculated. For this reason, the remainder of
this section is devoted to a brief discussion on the "proceeds" clause, the "mar-
ket value" clause, what is meant by "at the well," express and implied cove-
nants, and the effect of each on the deduction of post-production costs.
19
B. The "Proceeds" Clause
The proceeds lease is a "lease providing for a royalty of a portion of the
proceeds of the sale of oil or gas." 20  Although the language of the proceeds
lease is not always the same, the operative language indicates that royalty pay-
ments are to be calculated from the money received by the actual sale of the
gas. 2 1 In Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,22 the pertinent clause of the lease
provided that "the royalty for gas wells that may be drilled upon the above-
described premises shall be one-eighth of the money received by the Lessee
from the sale of said gas."'23 Typical of a simple gas royalty clause, 24 Professor
16 TERRENCE W. LYNAM, Royalty and Overriding Royalty Payments and Deductible Expenses,
in 6 EASTERN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION § 14.01 (1985).
17 Laura H. Burney, The Interaction of the Division Order and the Lease Royalty Clause, 28
ST. MARY'S L.J. 353. Professor Burney noted that "the royalty clause generally fails to include
the details necessary to calculate the lessor's royalty... " Id at 354. See also Comment, The
Value of Lessor's Share of Production Costs Where Gas Only is Produced, 25 TEx. L. REv. 641,
642 (1947). "The ordinary royalty clause pertaining to gas is one of the most ambiguous and
incomplete provisions of an oil and gas lease ever to be brought before the courts." Id See also
GEORGE SE1FKIN, Rights of Lessor and Lessee with Respect to Sale of Gas and as to Gas Royalty
Provisions, in 4 INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAX'N 181 (1953). "I suggest that many... contro-
versies might be avoided were more thought given to drafting royalty clauses. Most of the multi-
farious clauses now in use are grossly ambiguous, which may account for the fact that rarely has
lease language influenced the courts' decisions.... Undoubtedly some problems are complicated
almost beyond the power of solution by amending lease language. But many others could easily
be obviated by a few well chosen words." Id. at 216-17.
18 David A. Pierce, Incorporating A Century of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence into the "'Modern"
Oil and Gas Lease, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 786, 787 (1994). Professor Pierce noted that "[p]ersistent
litigation over the meaning of the document suggests the need for ... a better drafted document."
Id.
19 For a good discussion on some of the differences and similarities between "market value"
and "proceeds" clauses, see Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 P.2d I (Kan. 1977).
20 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 8, at 849.
21 See Smith v. Amoco Prod. Co., 31 P.3d 255, 268 (Kan. 2001).
22 187 S.E. 331 (W. Va. 1936).
23 Id. at 335.
24 "The lessee to pay for each gas well from the time and while the gas is marketed in the sum
[Vol. 107
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Donley provided an example of a more common royalty provision in oil and gas
leases prevalent since the 1920's forward. 25 Traditionally, under a proceeds
lease, "courts generally permit the lessee to deduct from the amounts actually
received by the lessee from the sale of the gas the lessor's proportionate share of
post-production costs, such as gathering, transportation, processing, and market-
ing, reasonably incurred by the lessee." 6
In Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp.,27 the Kansas Supreme Court consoli-
dated six cases and examined the royalty provision in each of the oil and gas
leases at issue.28  The court examined the language contained in the royalty
clauses and determined that "one-eighth of the proceeds from the sale of the
gas" to mean that "royalties under this lease are to be paid on amounts actually
received and lawfully retained by the producer [lessee]. '29 The court held that
the term "proceeds" is a significant term in the oil and gas industry because it
refers to the money obtained from the sale of gas.a° "[[Under the usual lease,
for every dollar the lessor receives, the lessee receives seven."
31
of one-eighth of the proceeds received from the sale thereof, payable each three months."
KUNTZ, supra note 14, at § 40.4.
25 "Should a well be found producing gas only, the full consideration to the Lessor for such
gas well and its products shall be a rental [royalty] payable within 30 days after the expiration of
each quarter beginning with the date when gas is marketed therefrom and continuing so long as
gas is produced and marketed or used off the premises, equal to one-eighth (1/8) of the proceeds
received by the Lessee from the sale of the gas if measured and sold at the well, but if not sold at
the well but after transmission or commingling with gas from other properties, then equal to one-
eighth (1/8) of the average prevailing price currently paid at the well in the same field by public
utility companies. ." DONLEY, supra note 13, at § 159.
26 MICHAEL P. IRviN, The Implied Covenant to Market In The Deregulated Gas Industry, in 42
ROCKY MouNrAiN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION § 18.03[2] (1997).
27 562 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1977).
28 Id. at 10.
29 Id. at 11.
30 Id.at 30.
31 Id. Citing Waechter v. Amoco Prod. Co., 537 P.2d 228 (Kan. 1975), the Lightcap court re-
affirmed stating, "Proceeds ordinarily refer to the money obtained by an actual sale. This conno-
tation is not without significance in the gas business. Where the sale is at the wellhead and the
lessor does not consent to the uncertainties of what the market or fair value or price of the gas may
be-he is willing to take what the lessee sells it for, relying on the lessee's self-interest in obtaining
the best price possible. Under the usual lease for every dollar the lessor receives the lessee re-
ceives seven. [W]here gas is sold at the wellhead there are 'proceeds' of that sale-the amount
received by the seller from the purchaser." Id. at 30.
2004]
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C. "Market Value" Clause
In a market value lease, the lessor's royalty payment is calculated from
the market value of the gas produced.32 Although the meaning of market value
varies across jurisdictions, the idea of market value can be stated in this manner:
[M]arket value is defined as the price property would bring
when it is offered for sale by one who desires, but is not obli-
gated to sell, and is bought by one who is under no necessity of
buying it. To determine market value of gas, the gas should be
valued as though it is free and available for sale.
33
It has also been said that that market value is the price a willing seller
would receive from a willing buyer in a free market.
34
A typical market value lease clause states that lessee will pay the lessor
the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas sold or used. What has
proven to be difficult is determining when and where the market value is as-
sessed. The majority of courts that have considered issues related to market
value have concluded that market value should be determined independent of
the contract price received by the lessee under a gas purchase contract. 36 A
good example of this can be found in Cotiga Development Co. v. United Fuel &
Gas Co.37 In Cotiga, the plaintiff was entitled to a royalty of "1/8 of the gas
produced from each gas well.. .at the rate received by the lessee for such gas."
38
The court applied a literal interpretation and concluded that the royalty was to
32 See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 8, at 621.
33 Yzaguirre v. KCS Res. Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368, 374 (Tex. 200 1)(citing Exxon Corp. v. Middel-
ton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1981)).
34 See DONLEY, supra note 13, at §40.4(d).
35 Yzaguirre, 53 S.W.3d at 372. "[t]he royalties to be paid by Lessee... on gas, including
casinghead gas or other gaseous substance, produced from said land and sold or used off the prem-
ises or for the extraction of gasoline or other product therefrom, the market value at the well of
one-eighth of the gas sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall be one-
eighth of the amount realized from such sale." Id
36 See, e.g., Imperial Colliery Co. v. Oxy USA Inc., 912 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying
West Virginia law); Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.
1984) on remand, 905 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Mississippi law); Exxon Corp., v. Mid-
dleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981); Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 586 P.2d 298 (Mont. 1978);
Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 P.2d I (Kan. 1977), cert denied, 434 US 876 (1977); Texas Oil
and Gas Co. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968);.
37 128 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. 1962).
38 Id. at 632.
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be paid on the proceeds from the sale of the gas regardless of where the sale is
made.
39
The "at the well" language in a lease is important to help determine the
point of valuation for the oil or gas produced.
D. "At the Well"
According to well known commentators, "[t]he term 'at the well' when
used with reference to oil and gas royalty valuation, is commonly understood to
mean that the oil and gas is to be valued in its unprocessed state as it comes to
the surface at the mouth of the well." 40 The majority of producing states hold
that in a royalty clause, the term "at the well" is a point of valuation that refers
to the location and quality of gas brought to the surface.
4 1
In Martin v. Glass,42 the court held, "to determine the amount of royalty
to be paid in cash, the lease must be examined to ascertain the point at which the
royalty clause fixes the price of gas." 43 After examining the express language of
the lease, the court concluded, "it is well settled that the phrase 'at the well' ...
establishes the point [of valuation] at the mouth of the well."" In Piney Woods
Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co.,45 the Fifth Circuit examined the "at the
well" language contained in the royalty provision of a Mississippi oil and gas
lease.46 Under Mississippi law, the court interpreted the "at the well" language
to denote the royalty payments are to compensate the lessor "for the value of the
gas at the well: that is, the value of the gas after the lessee fulfills its obligation
under the lease to produce gas at the surface, but before the lessee adds to the
39 Id. at 633.
40 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 8.
41 BRIAN S. TOOLEY & KEITH S. TOOLEY, The Marketable Gas Product Approach in the Natu-
ral Gas Royalty Case, in 44 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN. § 21.04[2][b]. See also id. at n.27;
Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 997 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Heritage Res., Inc. v.
Nations' Bank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996); Hurinenko v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 69 F.3d 283 (8th
Cir. 1995) (applying North Dakota law); Atlantic Richfield v. State, 262 Cal. Rptr. 683 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989); Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 679 F. Supp 1425 (W.D. Mich.
1988); Merritt v. Southwester Elec. Power Co., 499 So.2d 210 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Piney Woods
Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1005
(1985) (applying Mississippi law); Parnell, Inc. v. Giller, 372 S.W.2d 627 (Ark. 1963); Freeland
v. Sun Oil Co., 277 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1960) (applying Louisiana law); Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co.
v. Bushmaier, 255 S.W. 37 (Ark. 1923).
42 571 F.Supp. 1406 (N.D. Tex 1983).
43 Id. at 1410.
44 Id. at 1411.
45 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984).
46 !d. at 228.
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value of the gas by processing or transporting it." 47 Therefore, "at the well"
determines the point of valuation where the gas is brought to the surface, and the
price of such gas is based on the value before processing and does not include• 48
increases in value from processing or transportation. Consequently, for roy-
alties paid "at the well," the lessors "may be charged with processing costs,..
.[meaning] all expenses subsequent to production, relating to the processing,
transportation, and marketing of gas.'49
These two cases provide a few examples of the typical meaning and
contract construction given to the language "at the well" in an oil and gas lease
royalty provision. Additionally, these cases offer further evidence that the "at
the well" language is significant when determining the point of valuation for the
gas produced.
E. Express and Implied Covenants
Due to the increased attention being devoted to the implied covenant to
market, it is im ortant to discuss how the implied covenants and express cove-
nants co-exist. Express covenants are spelled out in the actual writing of the
document:
[A]s used in the oil and gas industry, [an express covenant is] a
written promise in a lease... or other instrument. Such express
covenants relate to a variety of subjects: e.g., in the lease, to the
47 Id. at 231.
48 See Id. at 240.
49 Id.
50 For a good discussion of express and implied covenants, see DAVID E. PIERCE, Exploring
the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant to Market, in 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
FDN § 10.04 (2002) "Professor Merrill's approach to implied covenants is not based upon inter-
preting the oil and gas lease. The foundation for his analysis is a policy of protecting the lessor to
the extent the lease does not expressly, and precisely, address the matter. Therefore, he would
recognize implied covenants to protect the lessor, even when the oil and gas lease expressly ad-
dresses the matter, so long as the implied obligations are not inconsistent with the express obliga-
tions." Id. However, in West Virginia, if there is an express provision in a lease, an implied cove-
nant cannot trump what is expressed in the lease. Professor Merril's approach is similar to the
approach taken in Garman and Wellman. This point is inconsistent with general law in West Vir-
ginia on contract interpretation. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 cmt. c
(1981); JOHN S. LowE, OIL AND GAS IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 1995); MARTIN & KRAMER, supra
note 3, at § 803 (2001); MAURICE A. MERRILL, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL
AND GAS LEASES §2, §6, §7 (2d ed. 1940) ("The objective interpretation in the general law of
contracts is to carry out the understandings of the parties rather than to impose obligations on
them contrary to their understanding: 'the courts do not make a contract for the parties."'); Jacque-
line Lang Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law Under Federal Energy Price Regula-
tion, 34 VAND. L. REV 1473 (1981); Jacqueline Lang Weaver, When Express Clauses Bar Implied
Covenants, Especially in Natural Gas Marketing Scenarios, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 491 (1997).
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payment of royalty, the furnishing of free gas to the lessor, the
burial of pipelines .... 51
In the absence of express language in the contract, courts will impose
implied obligations on the lessee. 52 Typically, there are two reasons why courts
will imply covenants in oil and gas leases against the lessee. The first reason is
to complete an incomplete contract (where the lease is silent), and the second
reason is to make the contract fair or more fair to the lessor.5 3 These two cate-
gories are usually referred to as "implied in fact"54 or "implied in law." 55 There
have been a number of courts and commentators who have discussed these two
categories.
56
In Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, Inc., 57 the Texas Supreme Court pro-
vides an example of an implied-in-fact approach to analyzing the oil and gas
lease royalty clause. The issue before the court turned on the interpretation of
51 See WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, supra note 8, at 384.
52 See Smith v. Amoco Prod. Co., 31 P.3d 255, 265-68 (Kan. 2001), for a discussion on the
two types of implied covenants ("implied in fact" and "implied in law").
53 DAVID E. PIERCE, Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant to
Market, in 48 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION § 10.04 (2002).
54 Id. MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 5, at § 803 (1998). "A covenant is implied in fact when
its existence is derived from the written agreement and the circumstances surrounding its execu-
tion." Id.
55 Id. "A covenant is implied in law when it is added to the contract by a court to promote
fairness, justice, and equity." Id.
56 See generally id; Smith v. Amoco Prod. Co., 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2001); Yzaguirre v. KCS
Res., Inc., 53 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. 2001); Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc. 557 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va.
2001); Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 894 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001); Sternberger v. Marathon Oil
Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995); Garman v. Conoco, Inc. 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994); TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Comm'rs of the Land Office, 903 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1994); Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., 854
P.2d 880 (Okla. 1993); Schupbach v. Cont'l Oil Co., 394 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1964); Gilmore v. Superior
Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964); Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla.
1989); JOHN S. LowE, OIL AND GAS IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 1995); MAURICE A. MERRILL, THE
LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES §2, §6, §7 (2d ed. 1940) "Of
course, the implied covenant is a fiction, used like other fictions by the law in order to achieve a
desirable result. The parties have not agreed consciously upon the terms which the law implies; it
is even possible that they have never consciously directed their attention to the matter. The obli-
gations are imposed, not by the agreement of the parties, but by operation of law." Id. at § 7.;
MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 5, at § 803. "A covenant is implied in fact when its existence is
derived from the written agreement and the circumstances surrounding its execution. A covenant
is implied in law when it is added to the contract by a court to promote fairness, justice, and eq-
uity." Id. at § 803; Jacqueline Lang Weaver, When Express Clauses Bar Implied Covenants, Espe-
cially in Natural Gas Marketing Scenarios, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 491 (1997); Jacqueline Lang
Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law Under Federal Energy Price Regulation, 34
VAND. L. REv 1473 (1981),
57 53 S.W.3d 368, 374 (Tex. 2001).
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the lease royalty provision. The petitioners brought suit because KCS was
paying royalties on the open-market value of the gas rather than the greater
amount actually realized from the sale of the gas (KCS was selling the gas at a
higher price under a Gas Purchase Agreement with a pipeline company).
59
Yzaguirre argued that the "market value" royalty payments should be based on
the actual proceeds from the sale of gas, 60 while KCS argued that the "market
value" royalty is "based on the prevailing market price at the time of sale."
6 1
Because the parties disputed the meaning of the "market value" and "amount
realized" language, the court began its analysis by reading the plain language of
the lease.
62
"[T]he parties to these leases, in unambiguous terms, based the royalty
on the amount realized for gas sales at the well and on market value for sales• ,,63
that occurred off the premises. Using an implied in fact analysis, the court
rejected the petitioners theory that the implied covenant to market was control-
ling on the issue of calculating royalty payments because the meaning of market
value is well established in Texas. Additionally, the court dismissed the peti-
tioners argument that implied covenants are necessary to "make sure the royalty
owner gets the best deal." 64 "[Tlhere is no implied covenant when the oil and
gas lease expressly covers the subject matter of an implied covenant."'65 The
58 The royalty clause at issue stated the following: "[Tihe royalties to be paid by Lessees are:
... on gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous substance, produced from said land and sold
or used off the premises or for the extraction of gasoline or other product therefrom, the market
value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the wells the
royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realizedfrom sale." Id at 372 (emphasis added).
59 The lease in this case is identical to the lease discussed in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela,
429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968). In Vela, Texas Oil & Gas entered into long term agreements for the
sale of gas at a fixed price. The market value of the gas eventually rose above the contract price,
and the lessors sued to recover the market value price of the gas. The court held that since the
market price exceeded the contract price, that the lessee's would be required to pay a royalty at the
prevailing market price. In contrast, Yzaguirre addresses a "Reverse Vela" scenario. In
Yzaguirre, the lessee entered into a gas purchase agreement that eventually exceeded the market
value of gas. Yzaguirre sued to recover a royalty on the greater amount received from the sale of
gas. Since the market value language of the lease controlled, the lessee was only required to pay
royalty based on the market value of the gas, and not the amount realized from sale.
60 Id.
61 Id. (citing Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. 1968)).
62 Id.
63 Id "The parties can draft either a 'market value' or a 'proceeds' royalty provision, and their
intent will be followed by the courts." id. at 372.
Id. at 374.
65 Id. at 373. "[W]hen parties reduce their agreements to writing, the written instrument is
presumed to embody their entire contract, and the court should not read into the instrument addi-
tional provisions unless this be necessary in order to effectuate the intention of the parties as dis-
closed by the contract as a whole." Id.
[Vol. 107
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss1/12
MAKING A STA TEMENT WITHOUT SAYING A WORD
court further held that implied covenants do "not override the express terms of
the oil and gas lease whenever a lessee negotiates a sales contract that turns out
to be especially lucrative. We will not now rewrite this lease's plain terms to
give the Royalty Owners the benefit of a bargain they never made."
66
In contrast to the rules of contract construction in Texas, the courts of
Colorado seem willing to ignore the express terms of a contract and instead de-
termine the lease to be silent on the issue in question. The Colorado Supreme
Court provides an excellent example of a covenant implied in law in its discus-
sion in Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co. 68 In its discussion on the terms of the
lease (express and implied), the court was mindful of the general rule that the
lease should be construed against the party who drafted and offered the lease.
69
In short, the court stayed in line with this rule and construed the lease in favor of
the lessor and against the lessee. 7 Next, the court discussed this rule in the con-
text of the disparity in bargaining power between the lessor and lessee. "[T]his
rule is generally based on the recognition that the bargaining power between a
lessor and lessees is similar to that historically found between an insurance
company and its customers." 7 1 In support, the court offers that lessors are not
knowledgeable of the law of oil and gas, and that the lessees are experienced in
drafting and litigating oil and gas leases.
72
After discussing the disparity in bargaining power between lessors and
lessees, the court concluded the "at the well" language in the lease was insuffi-
66 Id. at 374.
67 DANIEL M. MCCLURE, Royalty Valuation and Payment Issues: Where Are We And Where
Are We Headed?, in 48 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINEaRAL LAW FOUNDATION § 11.02[2] (2002).
68 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001).
69 Id. at 901. See also DONLEY, supra note 13 at § 61. In his treatise, Professor Donley rea-
soned that landowners rely on the agent who brings the oil and gas lease. Id. Although "the law
says one signing a writing must know the law of it... if there were any doubt, it ought not be
construed ,most strongly against the lessor... but against him who solicited and prepared the
lease." Id.
70 Id. See also Hill v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 205 P.2d 643, 649 (Colo. 1949) (doubt as to a
contract's meaning should be resolved against the one who prepared it); Davis v. Cramer, 837
P.2d 218, 225 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (oil and gas leases are construed liberally in favor of lessor
and strictly against lessee); W.L. SUMMERS, 2 THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 372, at 487-94 (1959 &
2003 Supp.) (uncertainty or ambiguity as to meaning of contract will be construed against party
who prepared the contract; in oil and gas that is usually the lessee);.
71 Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 998, 902 (Colo. 2001).
72 Id. Professor Pierce noted that "[i]n essence the court deems each lessor to be hopelessly
ignorant and incapable of comprehending that the value of gas 'at the well' may be less than its
downstream value after it has been gathered, compressed, dehydrated, treated, processes, and
otherwise aggregated, packaged, and marketed." DAVID E. PIERCE, Exploring the Jurisprudential
underpinnings of the implied covenant to market, in 48 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW
FOUNDATION § 10.05 at n.53 (2002).
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cient to allocate costs and that the implied covenant to market was controlling.
73
By ignoring the "at the well" language in the lease (or at least determining that
the "at the well" language was silent on the issue of deducting downstream mar-
keting costs from the lessor's royalty payment), the court applies an implied-in-
law approach to protect the lessor from being taken advantage of by the lessee.
74
This implied-in-law approach is typical of the jurisdictions who have adopted
the "first marketable product" approach to oil and gas leases.
75
This section on the oil and gas lease helps to illustrate the competing
views on the issues of express and implied covenants, and on the deduction of
post-productions costs before calculating the royalty payment. The issue of
post-production costs typically arises when the lessee calculates the royalty
payment owed to the lessor. Under the traditional view, the lessee is responsible
for any costs associated with production (i.e. getting the oil or gas to the sur-
face). Once the oil and gas reached the surface, the lessee would then take
whatever steps were necessary to sell the gas (compression, dehydration, trans-
portation, etc.). The lessee then deducted these post-production costs propor-
tionately from the lessor's royalty payment.
Recently, however, the courts of Colorado, Kansas, and Oklahoma have
departed from the traditional view. These courts have held that the lessee has a
duty under the implied covenant to market to incur all costs necessary to place
the gas in a marketable condition. In essence, these jurisdictions have blurred
the line between costs associated with production and costs incurred subsequent
to production. Basically, costs viewed as post-production costs in Texas and
Louisiana have become costs associated with production in Colorado, Kansas,
and Oklahoma. As a result, it will be useful to discuss in more detail the tradi-
tional position and the recent departures from this position.
IV. TRADITIONAL POSITION
The traditional position on the deduction of post-production costs can be
found in the laws of Texas and Louisiana. The courts of Colorado, Kansas, and
Oklahoma recently departed from the traditional view on post-production costs,
73 Rogers, 29 P.3d at 902 "[I]nstead we conclude that because the leases are silent, we must
look to the implied covenant to market, and out previous decision in Garnan v. Conoco, to deter-
mine the proper allocation of costs." Id.
74 Id. at 902-06. Professor Pierce observed "[tihe court's analysis in Rogers is a pure implied-
in-law approach designed to give perhaps the vast majority of Colorado lessors a cost-free royalty
calculated on downstream values .... and will affect any lease that does not expressly, explicitly,
and precisely state the location of the permissible market and the specific costs that can be de-
ducted to calculate the royalty." DAVID E. PIERCE, Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings
of the Implied Covenant to Market, in 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 10.05 (2002).
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and their departure was highly criticized in the dissenting opinions of those de-
cisions.
A. Texas
A good summary of Texas law on the issue of post-production costs and
royalty deductions can be found in Martin v. Glass. In Martin v. Glass, the
defendant drilled two gas-producing wells on the leased premises.77 The parties
stipulated that although both wells were producing, the wells produced at an
.... 
. 78
insufficient pressure to move the gas into the nearby gathering lines. Since the
gas could not be marketed without entering the pipeline, the defendant had the
gas compressed, and delivered the gas through a meter into a pipeline system.
79
The defendant then charged the royalty owner with their proportionate share of
off lease compression costs based on the amount of gas delivered into the pipe-
line. 80 The central issue in this case is whether the costs of compression could
be proportionately charged against the royalty owner.81
The court begins its discussion by pointing out that a royalty interest is
free from all costs associated with the development and production of oil and
gas, but may, however, share in post-production costs. 82 Consequently, in order
to calculate the royalty payment it is necessary to examine the lease "to ascer-
tain the point at which the royalty clause fixes the price of the gas." 83 The per-
tinent part of the gas royalty provision reads as follows:
[T]he royalties to be paid by Lessee are: ... on gas, including
casinghead gas or other gaseous substance, produced from said
land and sold on or off the premises, one-eighth of the net pro-
ceeds from the sale thereof .... 84
The court concluded that the key phrases expressed in the royalty provi-
sion contained the following language: "at the well received," "net proceeds,"
76 571 F. Supp. 1406, 1408 (N.D. Tex. 1983).





82 Id. at 1410. See MARTTN & KRAMER, supra note 5, at §645.
83 Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. at 1410.
84 Id. The "at the well" language appeared in the next paragraph of the lease provision. Id.
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and "sold on or off the premises."'85 In examining each one, the court concluded
that "it is well settled that the phrase 'at the well received,' or similar terminol-
ogy, establishes the 'point' [of valuation] at the mouth of the well ,,86
The court further concluded that "net proceeds" clearly suggests that
certain costs are deductible. 'Net Proceeds' is typically defined as the sum re-
maining from gross proceeds of sale after payment of expenses." 87 Finally, the
court concluded, "the phrase 'sold on or off the premises' clearly implies that
the value of royalty will be the same whether the gas is sold on or off the prem-
ises." 88 The court reasoned that the royalty clause in the lease in question
should be interpreted as follows:
Regardless of whether the gas is sold on or off the leased prem-
ises, royalty is based on the value of all gas produced at the
mouth of the well. Costs incurred prior to production are to be
borne by the operator, while the costs incurred subsequent to
production (those necessary to render the gas marketable) are to
be borne on a pro rata basis between operating and non operat-
ing interests.
89
The court noted that the laws of Texas and Louisiana are the same be-
cause "both jurisdictions allow the deduction of post-production cost[s] when
royalty [payments are] determined 'at the mouth of the well."'' 90 Since the laws
of Texas hold that gas is produced when it is severed from the land at the well-
head, the compression charges were post-production costs and were properly
deducted from the royalty owners' interest.
91
Louisiana also holds that costs incurred subsequent to production can be
charged proportionately to the non-working interest in an oil and gas lease.
B. Louisiana
Merritt v. Southwestern Electric Power Co., 92 provides a good example
of Louisiana's jurisprudence on the deduction of post-production costs. In Mer-
ritt, the plaintiff (Merritt) granted a mineral lease that was subsequently as-




89 Id. at 1411-12. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 5, at §645.
90 Id. at 1414.
91 See id. at 1414-16.
92 499 So. 2d 210 (La. 1986).
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signed to Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO). 93 The well pro-
duced gas at a sufficient pressure to get the gas to the well-head. 94 However,
the transmission pipeline was in a location outside the premises covered by the
lease.9 5 Due to the location of the transmission pipeline, compression was nec-
essary to keep the flow pressure of the gas sufficient to move the gas from the
gathering lines into the transmission pipeline. 96 [W]ithout the compression, the
... [well] is capable of production but does not provide sufficient pressure to
effect a sale of the gas produced." 97 SWEPCO then constructed compression
facilities on the leased premises, and began charging the Merritts for compres-
sion costs.98 The Merritts then brought suit to dissolve the oil and gas lease and
to recover the amount of royalties withheld due to deductions for compression
costs.
99
In Louisiana, "market value is reconstructed by beginning with the
gross proceeds from the sale of the gas and deducting... any additional costs of
taking the gas from the wellhead (the point of production) to the point of
sale." 100 Thus, the court concluded, "if compression charges are necessary in
order for the well to produce, i.e. for the gas to reach the wellhead, then such
charges are not deductible from royalty payments."'l0 However, the court rea-
soned if "compression charges are necessary only to push the gas from a pro-
ducing well into the pipeline, then this cost is a post-production... cost and is
therefore deductible from royalty payments. 10 2 The Merritt court also found
Martin v. Glass10 3 to be directly on point. 14The Merritt court also provided a





98 See id. at 212.
99 See id.
100 Id. at 213 (parenthetical supplied in original).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 736 F.2d 1524 (5th Cir. 1984). For a discussion of Martin v. Glass, see supra notes 76-91
and accompanying text.
104 Merritt v. S.W. Elec. Power Cc., 499 SO. 2d at 214. "It should be noted that while Martin
involved the application of Texas law, the Martin court relied heavily on Freeland, ... construing
Louisiana law, and noted that Texas and Louisiana law are the same in that both jurisdictions
allow the deductions of post-production costs when the royalty payment is determined 'at the
mouth of the well."' Id. at 214 (internal quotations provided in original).
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good discussion on other cases where courts have interpreted Louisiana law
applicable to similar market value lease provisions.
105
In Freeland v. Sun Oil Co.,10 6 the Fifth Circuit interpreted a similar
lease provision under Louisiana law stating, "in determining market value costs
which are essential to make a commodity worth anything or worth more must be
borne proportionately by those who benefit ... [and] all increases in the ultimate
sales value attributable to the expenses incurred in transporting and processing
the commodity must be deducted."' 107 A number of other cases applying Louisi-
ana law have determined that the lessee is entitled to deduct various types of
costs proportionately from the royalty payments. 108 The court also reasoned
that "the lessee has an implied obligation to market minerals discovered and
capable of producing in paying quantities... [and] since marketing the minerals
benefits both the lessee and the royalty owner [lessor], the royalty owner should
bear a proportionate share of the marketing costs."
10 9
V. RECENT REVISIONIST DECISIONS ON THE TRADITIONAL POSITION
The states of Colorado, Kansas, and Oklahoma have all broken away
from the traditional position that was discussed in the previous section. These
jurisdictions have imposed implied covenants on oil and gas producers to absorb
all costs associated with bringing the minerals to market. The West Virginia
Supreme Court relied heavily on the Colorado decision in Garman v. Conoco.
110
For this reason, we will begin our discussion of the recent revisionist decisions
with the state of Colorado.
105 See id.
106 277 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1960).
107 Id. at 159 (footnote omitted).
108 See Freeland v. Sun Oil Co., 277 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1960) (extraction costs); Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Johnson, 155 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1946) (transportation and separation costs); Sartor v.
United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 84 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1936) (transportation costs); Crichton v. Stan-
dard Oil Co. of La., 150 So. 668 (La. 1933) (extraction costs); Coyle v. La. Gas & Fuel Co., 144
So. 737 (La. 1932) (extraction costs); Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 152 So. 561 (La. 1834)
(transportation costs). Additionally, in Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 US 620 (1944), the
Supreme Court expressly noted that in determining a gas royalty payable "at the well," Louisiana
law provides for a proportionate deduction of the costs of gathering and delivering the gas to a
pipeline system.
1o9 Merritt, 499 So. 2d at 214.
110 886 P.2d 652 (Co. 1994).
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A. Colorado
The recent groundbreaking decision in Colorado is Garman v. Conoco,
Inc. III In Garman, the Supreme Court of Colorado responded to the following
question certified to it from the United States District Court:
Under Colorado law, is the owner of an overriding royalty in-
terest in gas production required to bear a proportionate share of
post-production costs, such as processing, transportation, and
compression, when the assignment creating the overriding roy-
alty interest is silent as to how post-production costs are to be
borne? 1
1 2
During the period from January, 1987 to April, 1993, the Garmans re-
ceived $2.2 million in royalty payments, while during the same period Conoco
withheld $459,1 11 for certain post-production costs. 1 13 The Garmans asserted
that post-production costs incurred in order to transform the gas into a market-
able product should not be charged to the lessor." 14 The Garmans relied on the
law from Kansas and Oklahoma, while Conoco relied on the law from Texas
and Louisiana. The court then examined the competing interests theories as laid
out in Kansas/Oklahoma and Texas/Louisiana. 1 5 Although the court's answer
was "limited to those post-production costs required to transform raw gas into a
marketable product" the court adopted the view espoused by the courts of Okla-
homa and Kansas. The court stated:
As we explained at the outset, many different types of expenses
may be involved in the conversion process. Upon obtaining a
marketable product, any additional costs incurred to enhance
the value of the marketable gas, such as those costs conceded
by the Garmans, may be charged against nonworking interest
owners. To the extent that certain processing costs enhance the
value of an already marketable product the burden should be
placed upon the lessee to show such costs are reasonable, and
" 886 P.2d 652 (Co. 1994). The decision in Garman is cited by the courts of Oklahoma and
Kansas in major decisions on the subject. Additionally, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals relies heavily on the Garman decision in its opinion in Wellman v. Energy Resources,
557 S.E.2d 254 (W.Va. 2001).
112 Garman v. Conoco, 886 P.2d at 653.
113 See id. at 655.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 657-58. For a discussion of the Texas and Louisiana line of cases see supra notes
76-111 and the accompanying text. For a discussion of the Kansas and Oklahoma line of cases
see supra notes 128-154 and the accompanying text.
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that actual royalty revenues increase in proportion with the
costs assessed against the nonworking interest.116
The most recent, and leading case out of Colorado is Rogers v. Wester-
man Farm Co.1 17 At issue in Rogers was the "at the well" language in a royalty
provision and whether or not that language addresses the allocation of certain
costs. 11 8 The court determined that since the lease was silent on the allocation
of costs, the implied covenant to market was controlling.1 19 The court also relied
heavily on Garman as the framework of its analysis on the issue of marketabil-
ity, the first-marketable product rule, and the allocation of post-production
costs. 12  While the court recognized the differing views of courts and commen-
tators on the allocation of costs when the lease is silent,' 2 1 it ultimately rejected
the reasoning behind these decisions.12 2 The court then reasoned that to define
"marketability under the implied covenant to market ... [it is necessary to] look
to the first-marketable product rule for guidance."'t 23 To determine whether the124Th
gas is marketable is a factual inquiry that should be resolved by a jury. The
court held:
[o]nce the gas is deemed marketable based on a factual deter-
mination, the allocation of all costs can properly be determined.
Absent express lease provisions addressing allocation of costs,
the lessee's duty to market requires that the lessee bear the ex-
116 Id. at 660-61.
117 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001).
118 Id. at 891.
119 Id. at 896. "[W]here a lease is silent as to the allocation of costs, the implied covenant to
market obligates the lessee to incur costs necessary to render the gas marketable." Id. (citing
Garman v. Conoco, 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994)).
120 Id.
121 "[The] broader rule holds that costs incurred after a marketable product have been obtained,
that either enhance the value of the product or cause the product to be transported to another loca-
tion are shared by the lessee and lessor." Id. at 900 (citing 3 EUGENE KUNTz, 3 A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, § 40.5 (2001)). However, "[1If gas is marketable at the physical loca-
tion of the well, then transportation costs may be shared between the lessee and the lessor. How-
ever, if gas is not marketable at the physical location of the well, either because it is not in a mar-
ketable condition, or because it is not acceptable for a commercial market, then the lessee has not
met its burden of making the gas marketable." Rogers, 29 P.3d at 900. "Adopting the view that
the 'at the well' language determines which costs are deductible from royalty payments fails to
acknowledge that deductibility of costs is determined by whether the gas is marketable, not by the
physical location of the gas or the condition of the gas." Id at 900-01.
122 Rogers, 29 P.3d 901.
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penses incurred in obtaining a marketable product. Thus, the
expense of getting the product to a marketable condition and lo-
cation are borne by the lessee. Once a product is marketable,
however, additional costs incurred to either improve the prod-
uct, or transport the product, are to be shared proportionately by
the lessor and lessee. All costs must be reasonable. 125
B. Kansas
The leading case in Kansas is Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co.126 In
Sternberger, the plaintiff (Stemberger) was the representative of a class of plain-
tiffs who owned royalty interests in oil and gas leases that were owned by Mara-
thon.127 After the Stemberger's wells were drilled, Marathon was unable to
market the gas because no pipeline existed near the leased premises. 128 Eventu-
ally, Marathon paid the total cost ($127, 955.88) to construct a pipeline. 129 In
exchange for constructing the gathering lines, Marathon received a $. 10 - $.16
discount per MCF on the transportation costs from the transmission company.
30
After receiving this discount, Marathon then deducted $.12 per MCF from the
lessor's royalty payments. 131 The plaintiff then brought suit to recover the
amount deducted from the royalty payment.
In its discussion, the court stated that "[t]he lessee has the duty to pro-
duce a marketable product, and the lessee alone bears the expense in making the
product marketable." 132 The court reasoned that absent any express contractual
language, the lessor is not required to share any costs incurred to transform the
gas into a marketable product (i.e. compression, dehydration, and process-
ing). 13
3
125 Id. at 906.
126 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995).
127 See id at 792. The original lease was entered into with the TXO Production Corp. TXO
subsequently merged with Marathon Oil Company. Marathon Oil acquired the lease in question
during this merger with TXO. See id.
128 See id.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 793.
131 See id.
132 Id. at 799.
133 See id. at 800.
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C. Oklahoma
There are three cases in Oklahoma that apply the principle of the im-
plied covenant to market to issues of post-production costs. 134 The first case,
Wood v. TXO Prod Corp.,135 was decided in 1992. In Wood, the lessee (TXO)
was obligated to deliver gas into the pipeline company's gathering lines at a
certain pressure specified by the contract with the pipeline company. 136 The
wells produced at sufficient pressure for some time, but then the pressure
dropped below the pressure required for entry into the pipeline. 137 To keep
from breaching the contract with the pipeline, TXO constructed a compressor on
the lease premises, and deducted the proportionate cost from the lessor's royalty
payment. 138 The Wood court compared the laws of Kansas and Arkansas with
the laws of Texas and Louisiana.139 In electing to follow the law of Kansas, the
Wood court "interpret[ed] the lessee's duty to market to include the cost of pre-
paring the gas for market....," and held that "[i]n Oklahoma the lessee's duty to
market involves obtaining a marketable product."' 14 The court also reasoned
that if the lessee wants the lessor to share in the post-production costs, then the
lessee needs to include that provision in the lease so that the lessor can make an
informed economic decision.
141
Two years later in TXO Production Corp. v. State ex rel. Corn 'rs of
Land Office, 142 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma took an appeal from the district
court to examine the issue of post-production costs and royalty deductions in oil
and gas leases. The Oklahoma Supreme Court answered the question certified
to it from the United States District Court. The court reversed the district
court's judgment, expanding the implied covenant to market as adopted in
134 See generally Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203 (Ok. 1998); TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Oklahoma, 903 P.2d 259 (Ok. 1994); Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., 854 P.2d 880 (Ok.
1992).
135 854 P.2d 880 (Ok. 1992).
136 See id.
137 See id.
13s See id. at 880-81.
139 See id. at 881-82. Colorado and Kansas represent the recent revisionist position, while
Texas and Louisiana represent the traditional position on the subject. Compare Garman v.
Conoco, 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994); Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001);
and Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995); with Martin v. Glass, 571 F.
Supp. 1406 (N.D. Tex. 1983); Merritt v. Southwestern Electric Power Co., 499 So. 2d 210 (La.
1986). See also supra notes 76-111 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 113-135 and
accompanying text.
140 Wood, 854 P.2d at 882-83.
141 See id. at 883.
142 903 P.2d 259 (Ok. 1994).
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Wood. The court held that "[c]osts for compression, dehydration, and gathering
are not chargeable to... [the lessee] because such processes are necessary to
make the product marketable under the implied covenant to market."
143
Four years after the decision in TXO, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
issued its opinion in Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.144 The certified
question before the Mittelstaedt court was whether "an oil and gas lessee... [is]
entitled to deduct a proportional share of transportation, compression, dehydra-
tion, and blending costs from the royalty interest paid to the lessor?" 14 5 In an-
swering this question, the court concluded that the implied covenant to market
"prohibits a lessee from deducting a proportionate share of transportation, com-
pression, dehydration, and blending costs when such costs are associated with
creating a marketable product."
146
However, in this case, the gas was already marketable at the well. The
court then analyzed whether the lessor could charge the lessee a proportionate
share of the post-production costs when trying to enhance the value of the prod-
uct. The court's analysis then turned to laws of Colorado and Kansas to exam-
ine the decisions in Garman147 and Sternberger. 14  In Garman, the Supreme
Court of Colorado examined the law of Kansas and held that:
Once a marketable product is obtained, reasonable costs in-
curred to transport or enhance the value of the marketable gas
may be charged against nonworking interest owners. The les-
see has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the costs.
Absent a contract providing to the contrary, a nonworking inter-
est owner is not obligated to bear any share of production ex-
pense, such as compressing, transporting, and processing, un-
dertaken to transform gas into a marketable product. 
149
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma agreed with both Sternberger and
Garman and held that "[w]hen the gas is shown by the lessee to be in a market-
able form at the well the royalty owner may be charged a proportionate expense
of transporting that gas to the point of purchase."' 1 ( The court also reasoned
143 Id. at 263.
144 954 P.2d 1203 (Ok. 1998).
145 Id. at 1204-05.
14 Id. at 1205.
147 Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652 (Colo. 1994).
148 Stemberger v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995).
149 Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d at 1207 (citing Garman v. Conoco, Inc.,
984 P.2d 788, 800 (Co. 1994)).
150 Id. at 1208.
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that the burden of proving the reasonableness of costs falls on the lessee.' 5 ' The
lessor may be responsible for some post-production costs "when the costs are
reasonable, when the actual royalty revenues increase in proportion to the costs
assessed against the royalty interest, when the costs are associated with trans-
forming an already marketable product into an enhanced product, and when the
lessee meets its burden.
152
VI. WEST VIRGINIA
A. Discussion of Pre-Wellman Case Law
Before beginning a discussion of where West Virginia now stands, it is
important to understand West Virginia's jurisprudence on implied covenants
and royalty provisions. Cotiga Development Company v. United Fuel Gas Com-
pany and Berry Energy Consultants v. Bennett are two important cases that
help illustrate where West Virginia stood on the issue of royalty provisions and
the implied covenant to market before its most recent decision in Wellman v.
Energy Resources. 1
55
In Cotiga, the plaintiff (Cotiga) entered into an oil and gas lease with
Woods Oil and Gas Company (Woods). 156 Woods then assigned the lease to
United Fuel (United). At issue in this case were the royalty and marketing pro-
visions contained in the original lease. 157 The thrust of Cotiga's argument was
predicated on a failure to market gas produced from wells that were already on-
line. 158 The royalty provision provided in part that the lessee would "pay for
one-eighth (1/8) of the gas produced from each gas well drilled thereon, from
which gas is marketed, while the same is so marketed, at the rate received by
Lessee for such gas."'
159
In its discussion, the court focused on whether the language of the lease
was clearly expressed and unambiguous. The court reasoned that "[a]n oil and
gas lease which is clear in its provisions and free from ambiguity, either latent
or patent, should be considered on the basis of its express provisions and is not
15' Id. at 1210.
152 Id.
153 128 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. 1962).
154 331 S.E.2d 823 (W. Va. 1985).
155 557 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 2001).
156 See Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 128 S.E.2d at 630.
157 See id. at 631.
158 See id.
159 Id. at 630.
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subject to a practical construction by the parties." 160 The court also reasoned
that so long as a contract is valid it must become operative as the deliberate acts
of the parties, regardless of the reasonableness or fairness of the contract. 16 1 "It
is not the right or province of a court to alter, pervert or destroy the clear mean-
ing or intent of the parties as plainly expressed in their written contracts or to
make a new and different contract for them."
162
Next, the court focused on the marketing covenant contained in the
lease. The marketing covenant of the lease provided that the lessee is required
"to proceed with due diligence to... market the production... to the end that the
Lessor and the Lessee may derive the speediest return practicable for the. . .gas
recoverable thereunder, due consideration being always given to the condition
of the industry as a whole."' 163 After examining the marketing provision and
reviewing the record of the trial court, the court concluded that in a mineral
lease, the lessee "must be accorded a reasonable discretion in the rate of devel-
opment, production, and marketing."
1 64
In Berry, the West Virginia Supreme Court seemed willing to consider
the implied covenant to market. In Berry, the lessors (the Bennetts) entered into
a lease with the lessees "for the purpose of 'exploring and operating for' and
'producing and marketing'oil and gas."'165 The lease also provided that the les-
sors "were to receive a royalty for the marketing of gas from their property."
1 66
The Bennetts then brought suit against Berry for abandoning the lease. 167 The
thrust of their argument was that the lessees failed to market the gas or pursue
opportunities to sell the gas.168 The lessees, however, asserted that they made
diligent efforts to sell the gas, despite the fact that there were no transmission
lines available where the well was located. 169 The court reasoned that the les-
sees were obligated to put forth a reasonably diligent effort to market the gas.170The court further reasoned that where:
160 Id. at 634.
161 See id. at 634-5.
162 Id. at 633.
163 Id. at 635.
164 Id. at 636.
165 Berry Energy Consultants v. Bennett, 331 S.E.2d 823, 824 (W.Va. 1985) (internal quota-
tions provided).
166 Id. at 824.
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[a] lessor and a lessee have entered into a lease for the purpose
of "exploring and operating for" and "producing and market-
ing" oil and gas, and a well has been drilled by the lessee and
gas discovered, the payment or tender by the lessee of delay
rental for the leased premises does not relieve the lessee from
an implied obligation to exercise reasonable diligence in mar-
keting gas from the leased premises. 171
The case was remanded for determination of whether the lessees exercised rea-
sonable diligence to market the gas.
172
These two cases are important for two reasons. These cases illustrate
that prior to the decision in Wellman, West Virginia impliedly recognized that
the lessee has an implied obligation to exercise reasonable diligence in market-
ing gas. These cases also show that in West Virginia, if an oil and gas lease is
clear and unambiguous in its express provisions, the court will not interpret it,
but instead will enforce the express provisions.
In an article, one commentator suggested that the "court hopefully will
have an opportunity in the near future to fully consider the marketing issues in
more detail."' 173 Sixteen years later, the West Virginia Supreme Court took up
the marketing issues as they relate to the ability to deduct post-production costs
before paying royalties. In July 2001, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals rendered a decision in the case of Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc. 
174
B. Discussion of Wellman Facts
Benny Wellman owned two tracts of land located in Logan County,
West Virginia.17 5 Consisting of 200 acres and 23.5 acres respectively, Wellman
executed two oil and gas leases for these two tracts with Energy Resources,
Inc.176 The appellees, James T. Wellman and Grace Wellman, acquired their
interest in the two tracts of land from Benny Wellman subsequent to the execu-
tion of the oil and gas leases. 177 Both leases were identical land contained pro-
visions which were critical to the litigation. 178 The leases were to run for a pe-
171 Id. at 829.
172 See id.
173 F.T. GRAFF, JR, Implied Covenants to Market Natural Gas in a Changing Economy, in 6T
M
ANNUAL INsTiTuTE EASTERN MrNERAL LAW FouNDATION §17.02, § 17.02[3], at 17-8 (1985).
174 557 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 2001).
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riod of ten years "and for so long thereafter as drilling or working operations for
the oil and gas were conducted, or for so long as oil or gas were produced from
the leased premises." 179 More importantly, "the leases required Energy Re-
sources to pay a [1/8] royalty [interest to the Wellman's] on any oil and gas pro-
duced."' 180 The royalty provision of the lease stated:
Lessee agrees to deliver to Lessor, in tanks, tank cars, or pipe
line, a royalty of one-eighth (1/8) of all oil produced and saved
from the premises, and to pay to Lessor for gas produced from
any oil well and used by Lessee for the manufacture of gasoline
or any other product as royalty one-eighth (1/8) of the market
value of such gas at the mouth of the well; is [if] such gas is
sold by the Lessee, then as royalty one-eighth (1/8) of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of gas as such at the mouth of the well
where gas, condensate, distillate or other gaseous substance is
found. A8
Energy Resources failed to commence drilling a well on either of the
two leased tracts during the primary (ten year) term of the lease.18 2 However,
Energy Resources did re-open an abandoned well on the 23.5 acre tract after the
expiration of the primary term of its leases with the Wellmans, and the natural
gas produced from the re-opened well was then sold to the Mountaineer Gas
Company. 183 Energy Resources received $2.22 per thousand cubic feet ("mcf")
of gas that it sold to Mountaineer Gas.184 In return, Energy Resources paid the
Wellmans 1/8 of $0.87 for each thousand cubic feet of gas it sold to Mountain-
eer.18 5 Energy Resources subtracted certain post-production costs incurred pro-
ducing and bringing the gas to market, and maintained that it was able to deduct
certain expenses from the $2.22 that it received from the sale to Mountaineer
Gas. 186 In essence, Enery Resources subtracted $1.35 from the $2.22 it sold the
179 Id. at 257.
180 id.
181 Jd.at 257-8.
s82 See id. at 258. Under the primary term of the lease, the lessee was required to commence
drilling oil and gas wells, and so long thereafter as oil and gas are produced. If the lessee failed to
drill wells during the ten year period, then the lease would terminate. Energy Resources failed to
drill any wells during the primary term of the lease, however, they re-worked an abandoned well
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gas for to compensate for alleged post-production costs. Nothing in the record
shows why these costs were deducted or that $1.35 was a reasonable deduction
for post-production costs.
The Wellmans then brought suit against Energy Resources for, among
other things, failure to pay proper royalties on the existing well. The Circuit
Court of Logan County granted the Wellmans' motion for summary judg-
ment. 87 In granting the Wellmans' motion for summary judgment, the court
found that Energy Resources failed "to pay a proper one-eighth royalty on the
production from the re-worked well." 188 In awarding the Wellmans' substantial
damages, the court concluded that Energy Resources short-changed the Well-
mans because it failed to pay a proper royalty on the gas produced, and Energy
Resources produced no evidence of the basis for the alleged post-production
expenses to show that it was entitled to deduct post-production expenses from
the market value of the gas sold. 1
89
C. Discussion of Wellman Court's Analysis
Although the decision in Wellman will have a significant impact on the
way oil and gas leases are viewed and administered in West Virginia, this article
focuses on the court's discussion of royalty deductions and post-production
costs. The royalty provision on the lease provided in part that Energy Resources
was to pay the Wellmans "l/8of the proceeds from the sale of gas as such at the
mouth of the well where gas, condensate, distillate, or other gaseous substance is
found" when the gas produced was sold as natural gas. As discussed earlier,
Mountaineer Gas paid Energy Resources $2.22 per mcf from the Wellmans'
well. 19 1 Energy Resources then paid the Wellmans one-eighth of $.87 rather
than the $2.22. 92 Although this fact was not disputed, Energy Resources as-
serted that it was entitled to deduct certain expenses before calculating the
Wellmans' royalty.1 93 In rejecting this argument, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals reasoned that:
[t]here has been an attempt on the part of oil and gas producers
in recent years to charge the landowner with a pro rata share of
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lease such as the expense of transporting oil and gas to a point
of sale, and the expense of treating or altering the oil and gas so
as to put it in a marketable condition.
194
These expenses are typically referred to as "post-production costs."
195
The court then went on to discuss the policy reasons for not allowing a lessee to
charge post-production costs to the lessor. The court reasoned that the lessee
has a duty (either express or implied) to market the oil or gas produced and to
get the oil or gas into a marketable condition prior to transport. 197 The court
then went into an in depth discussion of the recent Colorado Supreme Court
decision in Garman v. Conoco.198 In conclusion, the court held that:
[W]est Virginia holds that a lessee impliedly covenants that he
will market oil or gas produced. Like the courts of Colorado,
199
Kansas,20 and Oklahoma, 201 the Court also believes that his-
torically the lessee has had to bear the cost of complying with
his covenants under the lease. It, therefore, reasonably should
follow that the lessee should bear the costs associated with mar-
keting products produced under a lease.
20 2
The court went on to hold that "[i]f an oil and gas lease provides for a
royalty based on proceeds received by the lessee, unless the lease provides oth-
erwise, the lessee must bear all costs incurred in exploring for, producing, mar-
keting, and transporting the product to the point of sale."
20 3
The court further noted, however, that the lease provides that the royalty was to
be calculated at the mouth of the well and held:
[i]f an oil and gas lease provides that the lessor shall bear some
part of the costs incurred between the wellhead and the point of
194 Id. at 264. The court also recognized that only two jurisdictions (Texas and Louisiana) have
allowed a lessee to properly charge the lessor with a pro-rata share of these post-production costs.
Id.
195 For a discussion of post production costs see infra Part II.
196 See Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc., 557 S.E.2d at 264.
197 See id.
198 See supra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
199 For a discussion of the Colorado cases, see supra notes 113-127 and accompanying text.
200 For a discussion of the Kansas cases, see supra notes 128-135 and accompanying text.
201 For a discussion of the Oklahoma cases, see supra notes 136-154 and accompanying text.
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sale, the lessee shall be entitled to credit for those costs to the
extent that they were actually incurred and they were reason-
able. Before being entitled to such credit, however, the lessee
must prove, by evidence of the type normally developed in legal
proceedings requiring an accounting, that he, the lessee, actu-
ally incurred such costs and that they were reasonable. 204
In summary, the court held that a lessee impliedly covenants to market
oil and gas produced and that a lessee should bear the costs associated with mar-
keting the oil and gas produced under a lease. The court also held that on a pro-
ceeds lease, unless the lease provides otherwise, the lessee must bear all the
costs associated with exploring, producing, marketing, and transporting the oil
and gas to a point of sale. However, the court also held that if the lease provides
that the lessor bear part of the costs incurred between the wellhead and the point
of sale, that the lessee will be entitled to a credit so long as the costs incurred are
reasonable and actually incurred.
In the aftermath of Wellman, many West Virginia oil and gas producers
are left scratching their heads trying to figure out where to go from here. The
next section of this article will attempt to break down the court's decision and
provide some guidance as to the implications of the holding on oil and gas pro-
ducers in West Virginia.
VII. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF WELLMAN
The court correctly identified the widely adopted view that the lessor is
"not chargeable with any of the costs of discovery and production." 20 5  The
court then implies that in recent years, the production companies have engaged
in a practice of avoiding their obligation to discover and produce oil and gas by
charging the lessor for transportation and other costs associated with producing
a marketable product. 206 The court concludes that production companies in-
vented a category of "post production costs in order to escape the obligation to
-- . .. ,,207
pay for marketing and transportation.
This rationale exemplifies West Virginia's long standing practice of
construing oil and gas leases in favor of the lessor.20 8 It also exemplifies an ex-
204 Id.
205 Id. at 263-64. See also infra Section II for a discussion on production costs and post-
production costs.
206 See id. at 264.
207 See id.
208 See Cotiga Dcv. Co. v. United Fuel, 128 S.E.2d 626, 630 (W. Va. 1962). "An oil and gas lease
which is clear in its provisions and free from ambiguity, either latent or patent, should be consid-
ered on the basis of its express provisions and is not subject to practical construction by the par-
ties." Id. at 630. "It is not the right or province of a court to alter, pervert or destroy the clear
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tension of law based on bad facts and beyond the issues raised in the trial court.
This underlying bias exemplifies the pro-plaintiff bias that many West Virginia
judges have against businesses operating within the state.2 °9
The duty to explore and produce oil and gas is fulfilled when the sub-
surface minerals are severed from the earth and brought to the surface at the
wellhead. As discussed in Part II supra, the majority of costs associated with
producing oil and gas are incurred during the exploration and discovery phase of
development. The reason the lessee retains a seven-eighths interest in the oil
and gas produced is so the lessee can recover its investment and make a profit
producing the minerals. As Professor Donley stated, "the primary object of both
the lessor and lessee is to discover, produce, and market subsurface minerals to
their mutual profit." 210
The phrase "mutual profit" implies that the lessor and lessee are in-
volved in a cooperative venture. If no minerals are produced, then neither the
lessee nor the lessor is able to share in the profit. Additionally, if no minerals
are produced, the lessee is out substantially more than is the lessor. Due to the
cooperative nature of the exploration and production of natural gas, in order to
encourage the mutual benefit for both parties, the better reasoned policy is that
once the minerals are brought to the surface, the lessor and lessee should share
proportionately in the post-production costs incurred. The Texas and Louisiana
policy more equitably divides the burdens in the exploration and production of
oil and gas.
By ignoring the fact that the lessor and lessee share in the profits, the
court seems to set the jurisprudential base line of giving the lessors a free ride.
The court in Wellman has now made it potentially less profitable for the lessee.
This free-rider policy is not what West Virginia needs if it wants to continue to
encourage development, this policy may create a financial impediment to the
continued production of marginal wells.
Implicit in West Virginia jurisprudence is the concept that a lessee has
an implied covenant to market the oil and gas produced. If the lessee was not
obligated to market the gas, then neither the lessee nor the lessor would be able
to share in the profits received from the sale of oil and gas. In Wellman, the
court holds that a "lessee impliedly covenants that he will market oil or gas pro-
duced ... and the lessee should bear the costs associated with marketing prod-
meaning or intent of the parties as plainly expressed in their written contracts or to make a new
and different contracts for them." Id. at 633. "The general rule as to oil and gas leases is that such
contracts will generally be liberally construed in favor of the lessor and strictly as against the
lessee." Martin v. Consol. Coal and Oil Corp., 133 S.E 626 at syl. pt. I (W.Va. 1926). See also
supra notes 69-70.
209 In particular, the Court's dicta regarding lessees in this state charging "post-production costs in
order to escape the obligation to pay..." also seems to reflect the jurisprudential bias, which is so
often cited by its contemporary critics. Wellman, 557 S.E.2d at 264.
210 See DONLEY, supra note 13.
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ucts produced under a lease."'2 11 The court however, confuses the implied cove-
nant to market with an obligation to enhance and transport to downstream loca-
tion, where the price is higher than it would be if purchased at the well. The
court never explicitly says that the lessee has an implied covenant to pay royalty
on an enhanced downstream value. The fact that these two concepts were con-
fused by the court will ultimately cause more litigation to come before the court.
The court's holding in Wellman, as stated, pertains only to a proceeds
lease. In footnote 3, the court stated, "[w]here leases call for the payment of
royalties based on the value of oil or gas produced, and sold directly, the Court
perceives that there are possibly different issues, and they are excluded from this
discussion. '" 2 12 The court correctly realizes that value or market value leases
present different issues and limited the decision to deal only with the proceeds
lease. Since the court refused to discuss market value lease clauses, that issue
will more than likely have its day in court in the near future.
However, since Wellman addresses only proceeds leases, it is important
to dissect the holding in relation to these types of leases. In Syllabus Point 4,
the court holds "[i]f an oil and gas lease provides for a royalty based on pro-
ceeds received by the lessee, unless the lease provides otherwise, the lessee
must bear all costs incurred in exploring for, producing, marketing, and trans-
porting the product to a point of sale. The court makes no specific mention
of costs for gathering, processing, compression, and dehydration. However,
syllabus point 4 is important because the court at least implies that an express
provision in the lease pertaining to costs will trump the implied covenant to
market, and that "at the well" language may be such an express provision.
This is consistent with the law of contract interpretation in West Vir-
ginia. In Cotiga, the court held that "an oil and gas lease which is clear in its
provisions and free from ambiguity, either latent or patent, should be considered
on the basis of its exfress provisions and is not subject to a practical construc-
tion by the parties."2 4 The Cotiga court went on to hold that "[i]t is not the
right or province of a court to alter, pervert or destroy the clear meaning or in-
tent of the parties as plainly expressed in their written contracts or to make a
new and different contracts for them."'2 15 Therefore, if a proceeds based oil and
gas lease plainly expresses that post-production costs will be borne proportion-
ately by the lessee and lessor, the court should not alter that express provision
but instead enforce the provision. As a result, production companies in West
211 Wellman, 557 S.E.2d at 265. For this idea, the court cites DONLEY supra note 12 at §70 and
§ 104.
212 Id. at 264 n.3.
213 id. at Syl. Pt. 4. (emphasis added).
214 Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel, 128 S.E.2d 626, 630 (W. Va. 1962) (emphasis added).
215 Id. at 633.
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Virginia should seriously consider drafting new lease forms that expressly,
clearly, and precisely address the issues of post-production costs.
Another interesting point on contract construction revolves around the
intent of the parties. The Wellman court believed "the language of the leases in
the present case indicat[ed] that the 'proceeds' shall be from the 'sale of gas at
the mouth of the well' . . .might be language indicating that the parties intended
that the Wellmans, as lessors, would bear part of the costs of transporting the
gas from the wellhead to the point of sale." The court at least impliedly rec-
ognizes that the language "at the wellhead" in the royalty clause establishes a
point of valuation for the gas produced, but declined to address the issue. The
main reason the court declined to address this issue is because Energy Resources
failed to introduce any evidence to show that post-production costs were actu-
ally incurred or that they were reasonable.
2 17
It would be interesting to see how the court would have dealt with this
issue had Energy Resources presented any evidence in opposition to the
Wellman's summary judgment motion because it is not the "province of the
court to alter, pervert, or destroy the clear meaning or intent" of the parties.
2 18
If Energy Resources had presented evidence to show the actual costs incurred,
the court might have been willing to consider that this language implies that the
lessor and lessee will share proportionately in the cost of transportation away
from the wellhead to a market.
In syllabus point 5, the court holds, "[i]f an oil and gas lease provides
that the lessor shall bear some part of the costs incurred between the wellhead
and the point of sale, the lessee shall be entitled to credit for those costs to the
extent that they were actually incurred and that they were reasonable."
2 19
Again, this point is important because it recognizes that the express terms of a
lease on the issue of cost will trump the implied covenant to market. However,
what this point leaves open to interpretation is the issue of reasonable costs.
The court never implicitly or explicitly states what reasonable costs are and
leaves the door wide open for the issue to be litigated.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The holding in Wellman leaves many issues pertaining to oil and gas
leases, royalty provisions, and post-production costs undecided. What we do
know is that when the lease is silent on the issue of post-production costs, the
lessee in a proceeds based oil and gas lease has an implied duty to market the
gas. Additionally, we know that if there is an express provision that addresses
216 Wellman, 557 S.E.2d at 265.
217 Id.
2t8 Cotiga, 128 S.E.2d at 633.
219 Wellman, 557 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 5 (emphasis added).
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the allocation of costs, the express provision will be given its clear and plain
meaning as expressed in the four comers of the lease. Therefore, it would be
wise for oil and gas producers to retire the old "Producers 88" and replace it
with a lease that clearly and expressly allocates costs.
What we do not know is where the court will draw the line on market
value leases. The court recognized that market value leases present a different
set of issues than proceeds leases but does not go into any detail on what the
different issues are. The court also leaves open for interpretation what exactly
constitutes reasonable costs. Also, the court makes no mention of costs for
gathering, processing, compressing, and dehydrating. These costs do fall into
the broad category of post-production costs, but are not included in exploring,
producing, transporting, or marketing. It is likely that in the near future the
court will be required to declare what constitutes reasonable costs and who in-
curs the costs for gathering, processing, compressing, and dehydrating of the gas
produced.
Finally, in West Yirginia, what the lease "says" when it is "silent" on
the issues of post-production costs is that the lessor will no longer be responsi-
ble for sharing proportionately in any costs incurred bringing the gas to market.
Oil and gas producers in West Virginia now need to crank up the volume and
make sure that the lease clearly and expressly "says" what costs the parties will
share in.
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